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Abstract 
Previous research demonstrated that mere instructions o approach one stimulus and avoid 
another stimulus result in an implicit preference for the to-be-approached over the to-be-avoided 
stimulus. To investigate the mechanisms underlying approach-avoidance (AA) instruction effects, 
we tested predictions of a propositional account and an associative self-anchoring account in a 
preregistered adversarial collaboration. Consistent with the propositional account, Experiment 1 
showed that avoidance instructions had a negative effect on implicit evaluations over and above 
the positive effect of approach instructions. Consistent with the associative self-anchoring 
account, Experiment 2 showed that changes in implicit self-stimulus linking mediated AA 
instruction effects on implicit evaluations. However, mediation was only partial, in that AA 
instructions showed a significant effect on implicit evaluations after controlling for implicit self-
stimulus linking. Together, the results support the contribution of propositional processes to AA 
instruction effects; the results remain ambiguous rega ding an additional contribution of 
associative self-anchoring. 
Keywords: approach, avoidance, instruction, implicit evaluation, self-anchoring, 
propositional theory 
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Mechanisms Underlying Approach-Avoidance Instruction Effects on Implicit Evaluation: 
Results of a Preregistered Adversarial Collaboration 
It has been recognized for decades that behavior is shaped by likes and dislikes (Allport, 
1935). Hence, understanding how these preferences are acquired is an important endeavor for 
psychological research. Interestingly, preferences sometimes arise as the result of performing 
specific behaviors (Olson & Stone, 2005). For example, revious research has shown that the 
repeated performance of approach and avoidance actions can cause changes in stimulus 
evaluations. When participants repeatedly approach ne stimulus and avoid another stimulus, 
they typically develop a preference for the approached stimulus over the avoided stimulus 
(Laham, Kashima, Dix, Wheeler, & Levis, 2014). These approach-avoidance (AA) training 
effects have been observed for a wide variety of stimuli, such as pictures of unfamiliar faces 
(Woud, Maas, Becker, & Rinck, 2013), racial groups (Kawakami, Phills, Steele, & Dovidio, 
2007), alcoholic beverages (Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, Becker, & Lindenmeyer, 2011), unhealthy 
foods (Zogmaister, Perugini, & Richetin, in press), insects and spiders (Jones, Vilensky, Vasey, 
& Fazio, 2013), and contamination-related objects (Amir, Kuckertz, & Najmi, 2013). 
In a recent set of studies, Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, and Smith (2015) obtained 
evidence that AA effects can also be observed as a re ult of mere instructions in the absence of 
actually performed actions. When participants were instructed to approach certain stimuli and 
avoid other stimuli, their evaluations of the to-be-approached stimuli were more positive than 
their evaluations of the to-be-avoided stimuli even though participants never actually performed 
the AA actions. Effects of AA instructions have been observed for novel non-words, fictitious 
social groups, and unfamiliar faces (Van Dessel, De Houwer, Roets, & Gast, 2016). Importantly, 
these AA instruction effects were similar to the effects involving actual AA training in that both 
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AA instructions and AA training influenced not only explicit (i.e., non-automatic) stimulus 
evaluations but also implicit (i.e., automatic) stimulus evaluations (Van Dessel, De Houwer, 
Gast, Smith, & De Schryver, 2016).  
Effects of AA instructions on implicit evaluation pose a challenge to a particular type of 
associative models that assume that (a) implicit evaluations reflect the automatic activation of 
associations in memory and (b) these associations are formed as the result of a slow-learning 
process that capitalizes on repeated co-occurrences, such as recurrent pairings of AA actions and 
stimuli (Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Yet, instruction-based AA effects 
are consistent with propositional models, which assume that implicit evaluations reflect the 
activation and generation of mental propositions about the relation between objects and events 
(e.g., De Houwer, 2009, 2014; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). When participants are 
instructed to approach or avoid a stimulus, they might generate propositions about these stimulus-
action relations, and these propositions can influece their implicit evaluations of the stimuli 
(Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, et al., 2016). For example, participants who learn that they will 
approach a stimulus may infer that this stimulus is po itive, and participants who learn that they 
will avoid a stimulus may infer that this stimulus is negative. These inferences could arise 
because of the knowledge that positive objects are typically approached and negative objects are 
avoided (Schneirla, 1959). People may have learned this rule through previous experiences 
during which they approached liked stimuli and avoided disliked stimuli. Although this 
knowledge does not logically imply that approached things are good and avoided things are bad, 
people are known to be prone to affirm the consequent (i. ., conclude that A is true on the basis 
of the fact that A implies B and B is present). Thus, when participants infer that the to-be-
approached stimulus is good and the to-be-avoided stimulus is bad, the (automatic) activation of 
this mental proposition could impact their implicit evaluations (De Houwer, 2014). 
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However, AA instruction effects on implicit evaluation are not necessarily incompatible 
with the view that implicit evaluations reflect the automatic activation of associations in memory 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011). Some dual-process models, such as the associative-
propositional evaluation (APE) model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), postulate that mental 
associations can be formed as the result of propositional inferences. According to the APE model, 
any information that allows participants to entertain the proposition that a stimulus is positive or 
negative may instigate the proactive construction of ew evaluative associations, which in turn 
may influence implicit evaluations. In line with this idea, changes in implicit evaluations have 
been observed when participants are provided with verbal information about the evaluative 
properties of a stimulus (Castelli, Zogmaister, Smith & Arcuri, 2004; Cone & Ferguson, 2015; 
Gawronski, Walther, & Blank, 2005; Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006). Importantly, these models 
predict a specific pattern of mediation such that ins ruction effects on explicit evaluation should 
mediate effects on implicit evaluation (e.g., Gawronski & Walther, 2008; Peters & Gawronski, 
2011a; Whitfield & Jordan, 2009; see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Case 4). 
Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, et al. (2016) recently performed two experiments that 
tested the mediating role of explicit evaluations i the effect of AA instructions on implicit 
evaluations. In these experiments, participants first received information about the evaluative 
traits of members of two fictitious social groups and were then given instructions to approach or 
avoid the names of members of these groups. The results showed that trait information eliminated 
the effects of AA instructions on explicit, but not implicit, evaluations. Statistical mediation 
analyses further showed that AA instructions had a direct effect on implicit evaluations that was 
not mediated by changes in explicit evaluations. These findings contradict the idea that AA 
instructions influence implicit evaluations only if these instructions are considered a valid basis 
for evaluation and, hence, are incorporated in explicit evaluations (see Gawronski & 
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Bodenhausen, 2006). Yet, the results are consistent with a propositional explanation of AA 
instruction effects and support the propositional model of evaluation which postulates that mental 
propositions, rather than associations, underlie implicit evaluation (De Houwer, 2014). 
Specifically, AA instructions might allow participants to consider the proposition that a to-be-
approached stimulus is positive and a to-be-avoided stimulus is negative. A dissociation between 
implicit and explicit evaluation will arise when this proposition is judged to be invalid (and thus 
dismissed when making an explicit evaluation) but still automatically retrieved when the stimuli 
are implicitly evaluated. 
Nevertheless, there is an important alternative explanation of AA instruction effects on 
implicit evaluation that is compatible with associative theories of implicit evaluation. Effects of 
AA instructions on implicit evaluation could arise as the result of associative self-anchoring, 
which involves the transfer of positive valence from the self to a stimulus associated with the self 
as the result of a newly formed association between th  representation of the stimulus and the 
representation of the self (see Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & Becker, 2007). It is often assumed 
that approach behaviors are fundamentally related to pulling objects closer to the self (Förster, 
2001), which may result in accentuated psychological closeness between approached stimuli and 
the self (Nussinson, Seibt, Häfner, & Strack, 2010). In line with this idea, it has been argued that 
the repeated performance of approach behavior in response to a stimulus allows for the formation 
of a mental association between the representation of the approached stimulus and the positive 
representation of the self (Kawakami, Steele, Cifa, Phills, & Dovidio, 2008; Phills, Kawakami, 
Tabi, Nadolny, & Inzlicht, 2011). Once such an association has been established, the positive 
valence of the self may spread to the approached stimulus, and thereby influence implicit 
evaluations of the stimulus (Gawronski et al., 2007). This associative transfer of valence is 
assumed to be driven by processes of spreading activation without requiring any kind of higher-
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order propositional processes (Gawronski, Strack, & Bodenhausen, 2009). Although many 
theories assume that the formation of new associatins in memory is a slow, gradual process that 
requires repeated co-occurrences (e.g., Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000), some researchers have rejected this idea and argued that sufficiently strong 
associations can be formed as the result of mere instructions (e.g., Field, 2006; Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2007). From this perspective, mere instructions to approach a given stimulus might 
allow for the formation of self-stimulus associations, which may lead to more favorable implicit 
evaluations of the to-be-approached stimulus. 
In the current research, we engaged in a preregistered adversarial collaboration to test 
predictions of a propositional account and an associative self-anchoring account of AA 
instruction effects in two experiments. Experiment 1 investigated whether both approach 
instructions and avoidance instructions can cause changes in implicit stimulus evaluations. From 
the perspective of the associative self-anchoring account, AA instruction effects should occur due 
to the formation of self-stimulus associations as the result of approach instructions. Processing 
the semantic meaning of approach instructions should lead to the co-activation of a representation 
of the self-connected approach action and the to-be-approached stimulus, thereby instigating the 
automatic formation of an association between the to-be-approached stimulus and the self. Given 
that most people’s implicit self-evaluation is highly positive (Yamaguchi et al., 2001), the 
subsequent associative transfer of valence should result in a more positive implicit evaluation of 
the to-be-approached stimulus. In its original formulation, the associative self-anchoring 
hypothesis does not imply any additional effect of avoidance instructions. Associative self-
anchoring is assumed to involve a projection of characteristics of the self to stimuli that are 
connected to the self but it does not involve a projection of self-characteristics to stimuli that are 
negatively linked to the self (Gawronski et al., 2007). Thus, even though avoidance can be 
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construed as distancing the self from a certain stimulus (Nussinson et al., 2010), the associative 
self-anchoring account does not predict a more negative implicit evaluation for to-be-avoided 
stimuli. In the context of AA training effects, the operation of positive, but not negative, 
associative self-anchoring is typically assumed to explain why training to approach a certain 
stimulus can lead to changes in implicit evaluations whereas avoidance training does not (see 
Kawakami et al., 2008; Phills et al., 2011).  
Note that, even though current theorizing explicitly denies the possibility that avoidance 
leads to negative stimulus evaluations, it might still be possible to extend the associative self-
anchoring account in a manner such that it does predict a negative effect of avoidance actions or 
avoidance instructions. However, such an account would have to make a number of additional 
assumptions that seem questionable upon further scrutiny. First, one could argue that avoiding a 
certain stimulus (or receiving instructions to avoid a certain stimulus) may result in an inhibitory 
association between the representations of the self and the (to-be-)avoided stimulus. This 
assumption seems problematic, because a co-activation of these representations when performing 
the avoidance action or when reading the avoidance instructions should facilitate the formation of 
an excitatory rather than an inhibitory association. Second, even if avoidance actions or 
avoidance instructions result in an inhibitory association, it remains unclear why this should lead 
to a more negative evaluation of the (to-be-)avoided stimulus. According to this extended 
account, presentation of the stimulus should lead to the inhibition of the representation of the self 
via the inhibitory association and prevent transfer of positive valence from the self to the 
stimulus. However, preventing the transfer of positive valence is not the same as triggering the 
transfer of negative valence. Hence, it is difficult to explain how an inhibitory association would 
allow for the transfer of negative valence to the (to-be-)avoided stimulus. Third, one could argue 
that avoidance actions and avoidance instructions create an excitatory association between the 
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(to-be-)avoided stimulus and a negatively evaluated representation of “not-me.” However, such 
an account directly contradicts a core assumption of associative theories that negations involve 
propositional processes and cannot be accomplished via associative processing (Deutsch, 
Gawronski, & Strack, 2006; Gawronski, Deutsch, Mbirkou, Seibt, & Strack, 2008). Hence, from 
the perspective of an associative self-anchoring account, AA instructions should lead to more 
favorable evaluations of the to-be-approached stimulus without affecting evaluations of the to-be-
avoided stimulus. 
In contrast, a propositional account predicts that both approach and avoidance instructions 
can influence implicit evaluations. According to this account, participants might infer not only 
that a to-be-approached stimulus is positive (because they typically approach positive objects), 
but also that a to-be-avoided stimulus is negative (because they typically avoid negative objects). 
Once participants have acquired this propositional information about the valence of the stimuli, it 
may be activated automatically and influence implicit stimulus evaluations (De Houwer, 2014). 
As a result, AA instructions should not only lead to more favorable implicit evaluations of the to-
be-approached stimulus but also to less favorable implicit evaluations of the to-be-avoided 
stimulus. Because the associative self-anchoring account and the propositional account make 
different predictions about effects of avoidance instructions on implicit evaluations, we can 
obtain an estimate of the relative contribution of associative self-anchoring processes and 
propositional processes in AA instruction effects by comparing the relative magnitude of 
approach instruction effects and avoidance instruction effects in Experiment 1. 
Experiment 2 further investigated whether AA instruc ion effects are mediated by the 
formation of a mental association between the representation of the self and the representation of 
the to-be-approached stimulus. Specifically, we tested whether AA instruction effects on implicit 
evaluations, as measured with an evaluative Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, 
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McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), are mediated by changes in implicit self-stimulus linking, as 
measured with a self-stimulus IAT.1 Such a mediation approach has also been used in previous 
research to establish the role of associative self-anchoring processes in the context of AA training 
effects (see Phills et al., 2011). According to the associative self-anchoring account, approach 
instructions produce changes in self-stimulus associati ns which, in turn, influence implicit 
evaluation. Because changes in self-stimulus associati ns should be reflected in facilitated 
implicit self-stimulus linking, this account predicts that AA instruction effects on the self-
stimulus IAT should mediate AA instruction effects on implicit evaluations. A propositional 
account, however, does not predict such a mediation. Though participants might more easily 
relate a to-be-approached stimulus to the self than a to-be-avoided stimulus (e.g., because they 
infer that a to-be-approached stimulus is more similar to the self than a to-be-avoided stimulus), 
there is no theoretical basis to assume that AA instruction effects on the self-stimulus IAT would 
mediate changes in implicit evaluations. By examining the extent to which AA instruction effects 
are mediated by changes in self-stimulus linking, Experiment 2 can provide a second estimate of 
the relative contribution of associative self-anchoring processes and propositional processes in 
these effects. 
The described hypotheses as well as the study design and data-analysis plan of 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 were pre-registered on the Open Science Framework prior to 
data-collection (which was done concurrently for the wo experiments). Any deviation from pre-
registration is noted in the main text. The pre-registered plan and all code and data are available 
at https://osf.io/4sajr/. The collaboration between authors qualifies as adversarial in that (a) the 
-                                                 
1 Following recommendations by De Houwer, Gawronski, and Barnes-Holmes (2013), we use the term implicit self-
stimulus linking to describe the behavioral phenomenon of automatically connecting the self and a stimulus on an 
implicit measure (see Ye & Gawronski, 2016). 
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second author put forward the associative self-anchoring account as an alternative for the 
propositional account of AA instruction effects developed by the other three authors (De Houwer, 
2014; Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, et al., 2016) and (b) the four authors jointly devised 
Experiments 1 and 2 as a way to distinguish between th  two competing accounts. 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, participants received instructions to approach a nonword (to-be-
approached word), avoid a second nonword (to-be-avoided word), and to perform no action in 
response to a third nonword (no-action word). After the instructions, implicit evaluations of the 
three stimuli were measured with an evaluative priming task (Fazio et al., 1986). We examined 
whether (a) implicit evaluations of the to-be-approached word were more positive than 
evaluations of the no-action word, and (b) implicit evaluations of the to-be-avoided word were 
more negative than evaluations of the no-action word. Following the recommendations of an 
anonymous reviewer, we also investigated whether implicit evaluations of the to-be-approached 
word deviated more strongly from implicit evaluations of the no-action word relative to 
evaluations of the to-be-avoided word.  
Method 
Participants and design. A total of 1750 English-speaking volunteers participated online 
via the Project Implicit research website (https://implicit.harvard.edu). In line with the standard 
treatment of Project Implicit data (e.g., Smith & De Houwer, 2015), we excluded data from 
participants who (a) did not fully complete all questions and tasks (366 participants; i.e., 
20.91%), (b) had error rates in the evaluative priming task that exceeded the population mean by 
more than 2.5 standard deviations (56 participants; i.e., 4.04%; population mean = 9.06 %, SD = 
11.24%), or (c) made at least one error on the questions that probed memory for the AA 
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instructions (534 participants; i.e., 40.03 %).2 Analyses were performed on the data of 794 
participants (548 women, mean age = 29, SD = 13).3  
Approach-avoidance instructions. All participants were told that the experiment would 
involve three meaningless words: UDIBNON, BAYRAM, and ENANWAL. Then participants 
read the following instructions: 
In this experiment you will see three words with no meaning: UDIBNON, BAYRAM, and 
ENANWAL. You will perform a task in which you will approach BAYRAM and avoid 
ENANWAL. It is very important to remember these thre words and to remember what 
you need to do when you see BAYRAM and ENANWAL. You will need all this information 
to complete the task successfully. Later on we will exp ain to you exactly how you will be 
able to perform this task. Before we present the thr e words and start the task, you will 
complete a categorization task. This will last about 5 minutes. Make sure that during that 
task you do not forget the instructions of the next task. Instructions: You will see three 
words with no meaning: UDIBNON, BAYRAM, and ENANWAL. Approach BAYRAM and 
avoid ENANWAL. Please press 'Continue' when you have memorized the instructions and 
are ready to begin the categorization task. 
-                                                 
2 We excluded participants with incorrect memory because we expected that, in line with previous results (Van 
Dessel et al., 2015), AA instructions would change evaluations only when participants correctly remembred these 
instructions. Importantly, including the data from all participants in the analyses reduced the magnitude of the 
instruction effects, but did not change the statistical significance of any of the reported effects. Yet, when we 
performed exploratory t-tests only on the data of participants who made one error or more on the memory questions, 
we found no evidence for approach or avoidance instruction effects (all ps >.25). 
3 For both Experiments 1 and 2, the sample sizes weredetermined prior to the data collections and pre-registered 
together with the respective study designs. In line with the pre-registered sample information, we stopped the data-
collections when at least 1000 participants had completed all measures of the experiment to ensure that we would 
have sufficient statistical power to detect even small effects after excluding data of participants with incorrect 
instruction memory (power > .80 to detect an effect size of d = 0.20). Because the studies could only be taken offli e 
at fixed points in time, the final sample size always exceeded the pre-determined sample size. For both studies, we 
report all manipulations and measures. All data were collected in one shot without intermittent data an lysis. 
APPROACH-AVOIDANCE INSTRUCTION EFFECTS               13 
 
Assignment of the words UDIBNON, BAYRAM, and ENANWAL to the approach, 
avoidance, or no action conditions was counterbalanced across participants. 
Evaluative priming task. To measure implicit evaluations, we used an evaluative 
priming task in which participants were asked to categorize target words as either positive or 
negative using the E and I keys of a computer keyboard. During all trials, the labels “bad” and 
“good” appeared in the left and right upper corners of the screen, respectively. In line with the 
procedures of earlier studies (e.g., Spruyt, De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 2007), a single trial 
consisted of a fixation cross presented for 500 ms, a blank screen for 500 ms, a prime for 200 ms, 
a blank screen for 50 ms, and the presentation of a target word. All stimuli were presented in 
white font against a black background. The inter-trial interval was set to vary randomly between 
500 ms and 1500 ms. Whenever an incorrect response wa  made or participants did not respond 
prior to the response deadline of 1500 ms, a red X was displayed in the center of the screen for 
1000 ms before the next trial. Participants were ask d to respond as quickly as possible without 
making too many errors. The three meaningless words UDIBNON, BAYRAM, and ENANWAL 
were used as prime stimuli. Targets consisted of 14 positive words (e.g., love, pleasure, smile) 
and 14 negative words (e.g., hate, pain, sadness). With the three primes and the two kinds of 
targets, there were six types of prime-target combinations. Participants first completed nine 
practice trials, which were followed by 120 critical test trials. The test trials were separated into 
two blocks of 60 trials, each containing 10 of the six types of prime-target combinations, 
presented in random order. 
Evaluative rating task. After completion of the evaluative priming task, participants 
were asked to rate their liking of each of the three nonwords by answering two questions for each 
nonword: “To what extent do you like BAYRAM/UDIBNON/ENANWAL?” and “To what 
extent do you have warm feelings for BAYRAM/UDIBNON/ENANWAL?”. Participants gave 
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their ratings on 9-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (not at all warm; like not at all) to 9 
(completely warm; like completely).  
Manipulation check. After completion of the evaluative ratings, participants were asked 
to complete a manipulation check for each nonword. Toward this end, participants were asked 
what they were instructed to do when seeing the word UDIBNON, BAYRAM, or ENANWAL. 
Participants answered by selecting one of four options of a dropdown menu with “approach it”, 
“avoid it”, “no action was specified”, and “I can't remember” as possible answers. After 
completion of the manipulation check, participants were informed that it was not necessary to 
complete the previously instructed AA task and they w re thanked for their participation. 
Results 
Latencies from incorrect responses in the evaluative priming task (7.22%) were 
eliminated and outlier latencies longer than 1000 ms and shorter than 300 ms (6.99% of the 
correct responses) were truncated.4 We calculated two evaluative priming scores for each 
-                                                 
4 The current data treatment deviated from our pre-registered data-reduction method, which was originally based on 
procedures used by Van Dessel et al. (2015). However, aft r discussion among the authors, we decided to adopt an 
alternative procedure that was based on previous resea ch by the second author (e.g., Deutsch & Gawronski, 2009; 
Gawronski, Balas, & Creighton, 2014). This decision was made on the basis of the following arguments. Fir t, the 
alternative method has produced more reliable evaluative priming scores than the pre-registered method in previous 
studies as well as in the current study. Second, using the alternative data-reduction method helped to resolve 
ambiguities in the results that were obtained with the pre-registered method by providing stronger evid nce for 
avoidance instruction effects. Importantly, using the pre-registered data-reduction method reduced the overall 
magnitude of the instruction effects, but did not result in any shift in significance other than the fact that avoidance 
instructions had only a marginally significant effect on implicit evaluations t(794) = -1.93, p = .055, d = 0.08, 95% 
CI diff = [-10.15, 0.28]. Because of this slight inconsistency in the results we decided to also analyze the data with 
item-based linear mixed effects models as implemented in R package lme-4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 
2014). This approach allowed us to further investigate the robustness of the approach and avoidance instruction 
effects by examining raw evaluative priming task reaction times (RTs) rather than compound priming scores. 
Moreover, it allowed us to control for variance due to unbalanced data and to control for (and test) possible effects of 
counterbalancing factors. These analyses supported the conclusions of the main analyses, including a significant 
negative evaluation of the to-be-avoided stimulus relative to the no-action word, χ2(1) = 11.11, p < .001, and revealed 
no important interactions with counterbalancing factors (see Appendix). We also decided to supplement pre-
registered t-test analyses with Bayes factors, calculated according to the procedures outlined by Rouder, Speckman, 
Sun, Morey, and Iverson (2009) because these Bayes Factors give an indication of how strongly the data support 
either the null hypothesis (BF0; reflecting the absence of a significant effect) or the alternative hypothesis (BF1; 
reflecting the presence of a significant effect). BFs between 1 and 3, between 3 and 10, and larger than 10, 
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participant, one for the to-be-approached word and one for the to-be-avoided word. Priming 
scores were calculated by (a) subtracting the mean late cies on trials with a positive target and a 
given action-related word prime from the mean latenci s on trials with a positive target and the 
no-action prime, (b) subtracting the mean latencies on trials with a negative target and a given 
action-related word prime from the mean latencies on trials with a negative target and the no-
action prime, and (c) subtracting the second difference score from the first difference score. The 
Spearman-Brown corrected split-half reliability of this evaluative priming score, calculated on 
the basis of an odd-even split, was r(792) = .18 for the to-be-approached word and r(792) = .11 
for the to-be-avoided word. 
We performed paired-sample t-tests on the evaluative priming scores for the to-be-
approached word and the to-be-avoided word. First, replicating the results of previous studies 
(e.g., Van Dessel et al., 2015), implicit evaluations of the to-be-approached word (M = 5.52, SD = 
53.66) were more favorable than implicit evaluations f the to-be-avoided word (M = -5.90, SD = 
50.81), t(793) = 5.95, p < .001, d = 0.21, 95% confidence interval of the difference (CI diff) = 
[7.65, 15.18]. As predicted by both the associative self-anchoring account and the propositional 
account, the priming score for the to-be-approached wor  was significantly larger than zero, 
indicating that participants preferred the to-be-approached word over the no-action word, t(793) 
= 2.90, p = .004, d = 0.10, 95% CI diff = [1.78, 9.25], BF1 = 5.10. Second, and most crucially, 
implicit evaluation scores of the to-be-avoided word were significantly smaller than zero, 
indicating that participants preferred the no-action word over the to-be-avoided word, t(793) = -
3.27, p = .001, d = 0.12, 95% CI diff = [-9.44, -2.36], BF1 = 15.95. Finally, a Bayesian t-test 
provided strong evidence in favor of the null hypothesis that the avoidance instruction effect on 
                                                                                                                                               
respectively designate ‘anecdotal evidence’, ‘substantial evidence’, and ‘strong evidence’ for either the null (BF0) or 
the alternative hypothesis (BF1) (Jeffreys, 1961). 
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implicit evaluations is not smaller in magnitude than the approach instruction effect, t(793) = -
0.12, p = .90, d = -0.004, 95% CI diff = [-6.61, 5.84], BF0 = 27.50.
5 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 provides evidence that (a) instructions to approach a stimulus lead to more 
positive implicit evaluations of the to-be-approached stimulus, (b) instructions to avoid a 
stimulus lead to more negative implicit evaluations f the to-be-avoided stimulus, and (c) 
approach instructions do not produce quantitatively larger effects than avoidance instructions. 
Bayesian factors indicated that our data provide substantial evidence for the first conclusion and 
strong evidence for the latter two conclusions. Overall, these conclusions are consistent with the 
predictions derived from the propositional account of AA instruction effects: both approach and 
avoidance instructions may allow participants to infer their liking or disliking of the stimulus, 
which should lead to corresponding changes in implicit evaluations. In contrast, the finding that 
avoidance instructions influenced implicit evaluations is difficult to reconcile with the associative 
self-anchoring account. This account implies that ins ruction effects should be limited to 
approach instructions, which may lead to a transfer of positive self-evaluations to the to-be-
approached stimulus via the formation of self-stimulus associations. However, an exclusive 
operation of associative self-anchoring does not prvide a straightforward explanation for the 
negative effects of avoidance instructions (see Gawronski et al., 2007, for a discussion). The 
observation that approach instructions do not produce greater effects than avoidance instructions 
provides suggestive evidence that associative self-anchoring processes do not play any role in AA 
instruction effects on stimulus evaluation over andbove propositional processes.  
Experiment 2 
-                                                 
5 Analyses on participants’ explicit rating scores rvealed a similar pattern as obtained for implicit evaluations. 
Because the two competing accounts do not make diffrent predictions for the effects of AA instructions on explicit 
evaluations, we report the results of these analyses in the Appendix. 
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In Experiment 2, participants received instructions to approach one nonword and avoid 
another nonword and then performed an evaluative IAT and a self-stimulus IAT, in counter-
balanced order. To test predictions of the associative self-anchoring account and the propositional 
account, we examined whether AA instruction effects on stimulus evaluations (as measured with 
an evaluative IAT) are mediated by the effect of AAinstructions on implicit self-stimulus linking 
(as measured with a self-stimulus IAT). 
Method 
Participants. A total of 1808 visitors of the Project Implicit res arch website participated 
in the study. In line with standard treatment of Project Implicit IAT data (e.g., Smith, De Houwer, 
& Nosek, 2013), we excluded participants who (a) did not fully complete all questions and tasks 
(440 participants; i.e., 24.34%), (b) had error rates above 30% for any of the IATs (25 
participants; i.e., 1.83%), (c) responded faster than 400 ms on more than 10% of the IAT trials for 
any of the IATs (84 participants; i.e., 6.35%), (d) had error rates above 40% for any of the critical 
IAT blocks (21 participants; i.e., 1.56%), or (e) did not correctly answer the memory questions 
(301 participants; i.e., 24.31%).6 Analyses were performed on the data of 937 participants (636 
women, mean age = 38, SD = 13). 
Procedure. The procedure of Experiment 2 was largely identical to Experiment 1 with a 
few exceptions. First, the experiment included only two nonwords: UDIBNON and BAYRAM. 
Participants received AA instructions specifying that they would perform a task in which they 
would approach UDIBNON and avoid BAYRAM (or vice versa). Second, following the AA 
instructions, participants completed two IATs instead of an evaluative priming task. In the 
evaluative IAT, participants categorized eight attribute words (e.g., wonderful, evil) as ‘positive’ 
-                                                 
6 Including the data from participants who did not crrectly answer the memory questions in the analyses did not 
change the statistical significance of any of the repo ted effects. 
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or ‘negative’ and the target words UDIBNON and BAYRAM as ‘Udibnon’ or ‘Bayram’. To 
avoid that the target stimuli were classified only on the basis of simple perceptual features, these 
words were presented in different font types (Arial Black and Fixedsys), capitalizations 
(uppercase and lowercase), and sizes (16pt and 18pt), resulting in 8 different stimuli for each 
nonword (for a similar procedure, see Zanon, De Houwer, Gast, & Smith, 2014). The attribute 
words were always presented in Arial Black, font size 16, uppercase. The evaluative IAT 
consisted of three practice blocks and two experimental blocks. Participants began the IAT with 
20 practice trials sorting the target words and 20 practice trials sorting positive and negative 
stimuli. Next, participants completed 56 trials in which UDIBNON and positive stimuli shared 
one response key and BAYRAM and negative stimuli shared another response key (or vice 
versa). Participants then practiced sorting target words on 40 trials with a reversed response key 
assignment. Finally, participants completed a second set of 56 trials in which UDIBNON shared 
a response key with negative and BAYRAM shared a response key with positive (or vice versa). 
If participants made an error in the categorization ask, a red “X” appeared on the screen until 
participants provided the correct response. Latencies were recorded until a correct response was 
made. In the self-stimulus IAT, participants categorized four self-related words (i.e., I, me, mine, 
and self) and four other-related words (i.e., they, them, their, and other) as ‘Self’ or ‘Other’ (see 
Phills et al., 2011) and the target words UDIBNON and BAYRAM as ‘Udibnon’ or ‘Bayram’. 
All other procedural details of the self-stimulus IAT were identical to the evaluative IAT. The 
order of the two IATs was counterbalanced across participants. 
Results 
Evaluative IAT. IAT scores for the evaluative IAT were calculated using the D2-
algorithm, which is the recommended scoring procedur  for IATs in which participants need to 
correct their mistakes before moving on to the next trial (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). 
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The IAT score was calculated on the basis of the diff rence in RTs on trials in which UDIBNON 
shared a response key with positive and UDIBNON shared  response key with negative 
compared to trials with a reversed response key assignment, such that higher scores indicate a 
stronger preference for BAYRAM over UDIBNON. The Spearman-Brown corrected split-half 
reliability of the evaluative IAT score, calculated on the basis of an odd-even split, was r(935) = 
.85. Across groups, participants displayed an implicit preference for BAYRAM over UDIBNON 
(M = 0.13, SD = 0.50), t(936) = 8.05, p < .001. More importantly, a between-groups t-test 
indicated a significant effect of AA instructions, t(935) = 23.89, p < .001, d = 1.56, 95% CI diff = 
[0.57, 0.67]. Participants who had been instructed to approach BAYRAM and avoid UDIBNON 
exhibited a stronger implicit preference for BAYRAM over UDIBNON (M = 0.43, SD = 0.38) 
than participants who had been instructed to avoid BAYRAM and approach UDIBNON (M = -
0.19, SD = 0.41). 
Self-Stimulus IAT. IAT scores for the self-stimulus IAT were calculated using the D2-
algorithm, such that higher scores indicate facilitated responses when BAYRAM shared a key 
with the self than when UDIBNON shared a key with the self. The Spearman-Brown corrected 
split-half reliability of the self-stimulus IAT score was r(935) = .81. Self-stimulus IAT scores 
showed a significant positive correlation with scores on the evaluative IAT, r(935) = .17, p < 
.001. Across groups, self-stimulus IAT scores indicated that participants more easily linked 
BAYRAM to the self than they linked UDIBNON to the s lf (M = 0.16, SD = 0.41), t(936) = 
11.45, p < .001. Crucially, a between-groups t-test indicated a significant effect of AA 
instructions, t(935) = 15.95, p < .001, d =1.04, 95% CI diff = [0.34, 0.43]. Participants who had 
been instructed to approach BAYRAM and avoid UDIBNO had higher self-stimulus IAT 
scores (M = 0.34, SD = 0.37) than participants who had been instructed to avoid BAYRAM and 
approach UDIBNON (M = -0.05, SD = 0.36). 
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Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). Following the recommendations of an anonymous 
reviewer, we also performed a mixed ANOVA on IAT scores. This ANOVA included one 
within-subjects factor: IAT Type (evaluative IAT, self-stimulus IAT), and two between-subjects 
factors: IAT Order (evaluative IAT first, self-stimulus IAT first) and AA Instructions (approach 
BAYRAM and avoid UDIBNON, approach UDIBNON and avoid BAYRAM). We observed a 
main effect of AA instructions, F(1,1864) = 819.82, p < .001, a two-way interaction of AA 
Instructions and IAT Type, F(1,1864) = 44.69, p < .001, and a three-way interaction of AA 
Instructions, IAT Type, and IAT Order, F(1,1864) = 37.41, p < .001. Further examination of this 
three-way interaction revealed that the AA Instruction effect on the evaluative IAT was larger 
than the AA instruction effect on the self-stimulus IAT for participants who performed the 
evaluative IAT first (effect on the evaluative IAT: d = 1.88; effect on the self-stimulus IAT: d = 
0.93), F(1,954) = 85.41, p < .001, but not for participants who performed the self-stimulus IAT 
first (effect on the evaluative IAT: d = 1.26; effect on the self-stimulus IAT: d = 1.16), F(1,908) = 
0.04, p = .84. 
Mediation analysis. To investigate the relationship between AA instruction effects on the 
evaluative IAT and the self-stimulus IAT, we performed mediation analyses with the lavaan 
package (version 0.5-16; Rosseel, 2012). We used the bootstrap method to estimate standard 
errors for the effects. We first tested whether changes in implicit self-stimulus linking mediate the 
effect of AA instructions on implicit evaluations (ee Figure 1). Toward this end, evaluative IAT 
scores were simultaneously regressed on both AA instructions (approach BAYRAM and avoid 
UDIBNON versus approach UDIBNON and avoid BAYRAM) and self-stimulus IAT scores 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986). Consistent with the predictions of the self-anchoring account, the 
indirect effect of AA instructions on evaluative IAT scores with self-stimulus IAT scores as a 
mediator was statistically significant, β = .14, Z = 9.17, p <.001, 95% CI of β = [0.11,0.17], R2ind 
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= 0.15. However, the effect of AA instructions on the evaluative IAT score remained statistically 
significant after controlling for self-stimulus IAT scores, β = .48, Z = 17.47, p < .001, 95% CI of 
β = [0.43, 0.54], R2dir = 0.23, indicating that mediation via implicit self-stimulus linking was only 
partial rather than full. The proportion mediated (PM) measure was calculated in line with de 
Heus (2012) and revealed that 21.97% of the effect of AA instructions on implicit evaluations 
(i.e., 8.42% of the total variance in implicit evalu tions) could be accounted for by mediation via 
changes in self-stimulus linking. The direct pathway accounted for the residual 78.03% of the 
effect of AA instructions (i.e., 29.84% of the total v riance in implicit evaluations). Mediation 
analyses that were performed separately for participants who first completed the evaluative IAT 
and participants who first completed the self-stimulus IAT, indicated that, respectively, 15.27% 
and 37.05% of the AA instruction effect on implicit evaluations could be accounted for by 
mediation via self-stimulus linking. A mediation model in which the direct path from AA 
instructions to evaluative IAT scores was constrained to zero did not fit the data for either group 
of participants, χ2s > 59, ps < .001. The comparative fit index (CFI), which is one of the most 
common fit indices and least affected by sample siz(Fan, Thompson, & Wang, 1999), indicated 
poor fit of this mediation model (evaluative IAT first: CFI = 0.51; self-stimulus IAT first: CFI = 
0.83). 
We also tested the reverse mediation model, in which self-stimulus IAT scores were 
simultaneously regressed on both AA instructions and evaluative IAT scores (Figure 2). In this 
mediation model, the indirect effect of the AA instructions on self-stimulus IAT scores with 
evaluative IAT scores as a mediator was also significant, β = .19, Z = 9.37, p <.001, 95% CI of β 
= [0.15,0.23], R2ind = 0.11. AA instructions still had a significant effct on self-stimulus IAT 
scores after controlling for evaluative IAT scores, β =.19, Z = 6.46, p < .001, 95% CI of β = 
[0.13,0.25], R2dir = 0.04. Mediation via changes in evaluative IAT scores accounted for 49.48% 
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the AA instruction effect on self-stimulus IAT scores (evaluative IAT first: 61.86%; self-stimulus 
IAT: 43.89%). A mediation model in which the direct path from the AA condition variable to the 
self-stimulus IAT score was constrained to zero did not fit the data, χ2(1) = 44.32, p < .001. 
However, the CFI indicated good model fit for this re tricted model (evaluative IAT first: CFI = 
0.98; self-stimulus IAT first: CFI = 0.90).7 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 showed that AA instructions influenced both implicit evaluations, as 
measured with an evaluative IAT, and implicit self-stimulus linking, as measured with a self-
stimulus IAT. Consistent with the associative self-anchoring account, mediation analyses 
indicated that the effect of AA instructions on implicit evaluation was mediated by corresponding 
changes in self-stimulus linking. However, the obtained mediation was only partial, in that AA 
instructions influenced implicit evaluations after controlling for changes in implicit self-stimulus 
linking. The direct effect on implicit evaluations explained approximately 3.5 times the amount 
of variance in implicit evaluations due to AA instructions compared to the mediation via changes 
in self-stimulus IAT scores. Testing the reversed mediation model, we found that the effect of 
AA instructions on implicit self-stimulus linking was also partially mediated by changes in 
implicit evaluation. Mediation via implicit evaluations accounted for approximately the same 
amount of variance in self-stimulus IAT scores due to AA instructions as the direct effect. Thus, 
although the obtained mediation via implicit self-object linking is consistent with the associative 
-                                                 
7 We also performed t-test analyses on participants’ explicit rating scores of the non-words, revealing a  AA 
instruction effect. Similar to previous studies (e.g., Van Dessel et al., 2015), additional mediation analyses showed 
that AA instruction effects on implicit evaluations were not fully mediated by changes in explicit evaluations. 
Moreover, the AA instruction effect on evaluative IAT scores remained significant when a multiple mediation model 
was considered that included explicit evaluations ad self-stimulus IAT scores (or evaluative IAT scores) as 
mediators. It is important to note, however, that te results of these mediation analyses are difficult to interpret 
because the order of explicit and implicit measures wa  not counterbalanced in the current study. 
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self-anchoring account, the current findings suggest that AA instruction effects are also (and 
more so) driven by processes other than associative self-anchoring.  
General Discussion 
The current experiments were designed to test predictions of a propositional account and 
an associative self-anchoring account of AA instruction effects. Toward this end, we probed 
unique effects of approach and avoidance instructions on implicit evaluation (Experiment 1) and 
examined the mediating role of implicit self-stimulus linking in AA instruction effects on implicit 
evaluations (Experiment 2). Overall, the results fit best with a propositional explanation of AA 
instruction effects. 
The results of Experiment 1 indicate that both approach instructions and avoidance 
instructions can cause changes in implicit evaluations, as predicted by the propositional account. 
According to the associative self-anchoring account, approach instructions should lead to more 
favorable implicit evaluations of the to-be-approached stimulus. However, in the absence of 
additional assumptions, associative self-anchoring fails to explain how avoidance instructions 
may negatively influence implicit evaluations of the to-be-avoided stimulus. To accommodate the 
current findings, the associative self-anchoring account could be extended to allow for the 
possibility that avoidance instructions lead to a transfer of negative valence to the to-be-avoided 
stimulus either (a) via the formation of an inhibitory association between representations of the 
self and the to-be-avoided stimulus or (b) via an excitatory association between representations of 
“not-me” and the to-be-avoided stimulus. The current sults would imply that the effects of such 
negative associative self-anchoring can be of similar magnitude than effects that are obtained via 
positive self-anchoring. Note, however, that such extensions of the associative self-anchoring 
account are inconsistent with existing evidence for self-anchoring processes in the context of the 
ownership effect (see Gawronski et al., 2007, Experiment 3) or AA training effects (Phills et al., 
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2011). Moreover, as discussed in the introduction, such extensions of the self-anchoring account 
must rely on questionable assumptions, such as the assumptions that (a) avoidance results in 
inhibitory associations and that inhibition of the self-concept results in a negative affective 
reaction rather than the absence of a positive reaction or (b) associative processes are capable of 
performing negations. Thus, although the results of Experiment 1 do not rule out a potential 
contribution of associative self-anchoring to the obtained effect of approach instructions, the 
obtained effect of avoidance instructions is inconsistent with current ideas and evidence about 
self-anchoring. Yet, results are consistent with the hypothesized role of propositional processes, 
which predicts both a positive effect of approach instructions and a negative effect of avoidance 
instructions. 
Suggestive evidence for associative self-anchoring comes from Experiment 2, in which 
AA instruction effects on implicit evaluations were mediated by changes in implicit self-stimulus 
linking. This mediation pattern is predicted by theassociative self-anchoring account, but it is not 
predicted by the propositional account. However, the obtained mediation was only partial, in that 
AA instructions showed a significant effect on implicit evaluations after controlling for implicit 
self-object linking. A potential explanation for this finding is that propositional inferences and 
associative self-anchoring jointly contribute to AA instruction effects on implicit evaluations. 
With the confirmed contribution of propositional processes in Experiment 1, the mediation 
produced by associative self-anchoring should be only partial (rather than full), in that 
propositional processes should lead to a direct effect of AA instructions on implicit evaluations 
that is not mediated by implicit self-object linking. Thus, the indirect effect of AA instructions on 
implicit evaluations via implicit self-stimulus linking, which accounted for approximately 22% of 
the variance in AA instruction effects, might reflect the contribution of associative self-
anchoring, whereas the direct effect of AA instructions, which accounted for approximately 78% 
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of the variance in AA instruction effects, might reflect the contribution of propositional 
processes. 
Although a joint contribution of propositional processes and associative self-anchoring is 
consistent with the obtained pattern of results, it i  important to note that the partial mediation 
makes our data ambiguous about the proposed contribution of associative self-anchoring. From 
the perspective of the propositional account, one could argue that AA instructions should 
influence scores on the self-stimulus IAT if participants infer that the to-be-approached stimulus 
is more similar to the self than a to-be-avoided stimulus. In this case, the evaluative IAT and the 
self-stimulus IAT should both be affected by AA instructions, as found in Experiment 2. 
Moreover, because of their shared relation to a comm n third variable (i.e., AA instructions), the 
two IATs may show a modest positive correlation, again consistent with the findings of 
Experiment 2. As a result, mediation analyses should reveal a partial mediation pattern regardless 
of which variable is treated as the mediator versus the distal outcome. Because we obtained 
partial mediation in either case, our mediation analyses fail to provide unambiguous evidence for 
the proposed role of associative self-anchoring. On the one hand, it is possible that the obtained 
results reflect a joint contribution of propositional processes and associative self-anchoring. On 
the other hand, it is possible that AA instruction effects are exclusively driven by propositional 
processes, with the partial mediation patterns being due to the shared relation of implicit 
evaluations and implicit self-stimulus linking to AA instructions as a common antecedent. Thus, 
although the current findings provide clear support f r the hypothesized role of propositional 
processes, they remain ambiguous regarding an additional contribution of associative self-
anchoring. This ambiguity cannot be addressed with regression-based mediation analyses (e.g., 
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Baron & Kenny, 1986), but requires advanced experimntal designs to establish the specific 
structure of the underlying causal chain (e.g., Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005).8 
Overall, the current findings support the idea thatpropositional processes play an 
important role in AA instruction effects on implicit evaluation. This conclusion is consistent with 
the growing body of evidence showing that (a) verbal instructions can have strong, immediate 
effects on implicit evaluations (Castelli et al., 2004; Gregg et al., 2006; Whitfield & Jordan, 
2009) and (b) instruction-based changes in implicit evaluation depend on the operation of 
propositional processes (Cone & Ferguson, 2015; Peters & Gawronski, 2011b; Zanon et al., 
2014). The current results extend these findings by howing that propositional processes also play 
a major role in AA instruction effects. Yet, in contrast to instructions that specify evaluative 
qualities of stimuli (see Whitfield & Jordan, 2009), AA instructions seem to have a direct effect 
on implicit evaluations that is independent of changes in explicit evaluation (Van Dessel, De 
Houwer, Gast, et al., 2016).  
By uncovering the processes underlying the effects of AA instructions, our research 
provides important information that constrains mental process models of evaluation. Together 
with earlier research on AA instruction effects (e.g., Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, et al., 2016), 
the current findings are difficult to reconcile with a particular type of associative or dual-process 
models which claim that (a) implicit evaluations typically reflect the slow accrual of paired 
associations in memory (e.g., Rydell & McConnell, 2006) or (b) propositional processes can also 
-                                                 
8 Another problem with the mediation results of Experim nt 2 is that indices of model fit are difficult to reconcile 
with the proposed role of associative-self anchoring. A full mediation model with evaluative IAT scores as a 
mediator for the impact of AA instructions on self-stimulus IAT scores fit the data better than a full mediation model 
with self-stimulus IAT scores as a mediator of the impact of AA instructions on evaluative IAT scores. In the current 
study, the comparative fit index was .94 for the former model and .66 for the latter model. Values cloe to .95 are 
generally considered as indicating very good model fit and values below .90 indicate a poor fitting model (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999). 
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influence implicit evaluations but only via changes in explicit evaluation (e.g., Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006). Instead, the body of research on AA instructions seems to fit better with 
propositional models which assume that mental propositions can function as the proximal causes 
of changes in implicit evaluations independent of associative representations (De Houwer, 2014). 
Of course, distinguishing between broad classes of valuation theories on the basis of a single set 
of data is difficult, if not impossible. Proponents of a challenged theory can always make post-
hoc assumptions to explain unexpected findings (see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2015). For 
instance, associative accounts of implicit evaluation might explain the current results by 
postulating that changes in implicit evaluations can occur due to the formation of associations as 
the result of the pairing of a valenced action word (‘approach’ or ‘avoid’) and a stimulus in the 
instructions. We believe that scientific progress can be facilitated by pre-specifying the 
predictions of these theories and testing them in well-controlled studies. By using this method, 
the current study (a) provides further evidence that (automatic) effects of evaluative learning may 
depend on propositional processes, and thereby (b) contributes to our understanding of the 
processes underlying implicit evaluation. 
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Figure 1. Standardized estimates of mediation coefficients for mediation of AA instruction 
effects on evaluative IAT scores by changes in self-stimulus IAT scores. * p < .001. 
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Figure 2. Standardized estimates of mediation coefficients for mediation of AA instruction 
effects on self-stimulus IAT scores by changes in evaluative IAT scores. * p < .001. 
